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T
he El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is a climate event 
associated with warming sea surface temperatures in the 
Pacific Ocean. In years of extreme El Niño events, areas in northern 
Peru experience catastrophic flooding. As of 2010, it is possible 
for stakeholders in northern Peru to purchase a new form of 
insurance that pays out just as flooding begins and stakeholders 
begin incurring extra costs and consequential losses. Given the high 
basis risk associated with selling index insurance to households, 
this insurance is designed for firms and institutions that serve 
households that are highly exposed to El Niño. ENSO insurance 
is sold by a Peruvian insurance company, and a major global 
reinsurer carries most of the risk. This new insurance product is 
the first insurance to use sea surface temperature as the proxy 
for catastrophic losses and also the first regulated “forecast index 
insurance” product in the world. This innovation could enhance 
progress in developing index-based insurance products for extreme 
weather events.
Recent years have seen a growing number of pilot tests 
of index insurance for weather risk, motivated by an increased 
understanding of how natural disasters affect developing countries. 
Beyond immediate suffering (including deaths, destroyed assets, and 
lost income), disasters have troublesome indirect effects: economic 
growth can be disrupted, the poor are thrust into permanent 
poverty traps, and the mere presence of these risks constrains access 
to financial services and causes many decisionmakers to pursue low-
return, low-risk strategies that impede economic progress.
Much of the development of index insurance focuses on 
agriculture, because activities associated with agriculture remain 
the primary livelihood strategies for the rural poor in developing 
countries. Thus far, most index insurance pilots have involved 
products targeted at households—that is, micro-level products. 
Index insurance uses an objective measure (an index) of a natural 
event known to cause losses (such as excess rain, high river levels, or 
extreme sea surface temperatures). Using an index as the proxy for 
loss dispenses with expensive loss assessments. Furthermore, use of 
an index diminishes moral hazard and adverse selection, problems 
that plague traditional forms of insurance. Given these advantages, 
index insurance may be well suited to developing countries where 
data are sparse and delivery of financial services to smallholder 
households increases the per-unit cost of traditional insurance.
Despite the promise of index insurance, uptake by smallholder 
households is slow. Presently, index insurance may be better 
suited for risk aggregators—that is, groups or institutions that 
aggregate the risk of households either through the services 
they provide or through informal risk-sharing arrangements (for 
example, agricultural lenders, firms in the value chain, and farmer 
associations). Focusing first on risk aggregators should also help 
build linkages and sustainable products that will directly serve 
smallholder households.
Index insurance and correlated losses 
As a precondition of index insurance, losses created by the natural 
disaster to be insured must be strongly correlated—that is, a large 
number of individuals must suffer losses at the same time. Given 
that many individuals suffer a loss at the same time, risk aggregators 
will also suffer serious losses. Thus, correlated losses from natural 
disasters constrain the development of credit markets for the rural 
poor, particularly for those involved in agriculture. Lenders cannot 
absorb the risk exposure of a large number of borrowers who may be 
unable to pay off loans after a major natural disaster.
Likewise, an insurer deciding to write any form of insurance 
against extreme weather events must have a means to transfer these 
risks—generally through a global reinsurer. Insurers in developing 
countries often find obtaining access to reinsurance markets 
difficult. If the index being used is fully transparent, the global 
reinsurer is more likely to feel comfortable with the systems used to 
estimate the index. This is certainly the case for ENSO measurements, 
which have been developed over more than 50 years by the U.S. 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Extreme weather events such as drought and flooding can also 
have associated consequential losses that extend beyond traditional 
crop insurance, which pays for losses of a specific crop. For example, 
in a number of African countries, where owning livestock is a form 
of savings, extreme droughts compel large numbers of farmers to 
sell their livestock at the same time. Distressed sales of livestock 
on local markets depress local prices, compounding losses. Floods 
and droughts also generally influence the quality of crops, not just 
yields. Moreover, risk-management strategies to diversify cropping 
enterprises can quickly prove ineffective if droughts or floods 
negatively affect all of the crops at the same time.
ENSO insurance as a form of business-
interruption insurance
In Peru, where ENSO insurance is being tested, the consequential 
losses and problems associated with extreme rainfall and 
catastrophic flooding are enormous—crops are lost, trees die, soils 
wash away, transportation systems break down, incidence of disease 
(such as malaria) increases, and markets are destroyed. When 
individuals and local markets suffer in this fashion, firms in the 
value chain and the financial sector also suffer.
In the extreme El Niño years 1983 and 1998, the volume of 
water in the Piura River was about 40 times greater than normal. 
Although Piura was among the worst-affected areas, a number of 
other regions in northern Peru were also severely affected. In 1998, 
with a clear indication that El Niño was coming, farmers simply did 
not plant crops, resulting in a 27 percent drop in fertilizer sales in 
northern Peru. Agricultural lending was growing at a significant 
pace before the 1997–98 El Niño, but that growth came to a halt 
after the event. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) had a significant 
increase in problem loans. Because of the 1998 El Niño, the default 
rate on agricultural loans increased from about 8 percent of all 
agricultural loans to more than 18 percent for MFIs operating in the 
region of Piura. Loan default is defined as loans that were 60 days 
late or more in payments. Once loans fall into this category, the 
probability of collection is nearly zero. Additionally, member deposits 
and savings—the major sources of capital for the MFIs— declined 
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problems created by the event. It took at least three years to recover 
from the compounded problems of loan defaults, loan restructuring, 
and savings and member deposit withdrawals.
ENSO insurance was presented to the Peruvian insurance 
regulators as a form of business-interruption insurance designed 
to pay for consequential losses and extra costs linked to extreme 
flooding, which is highly correlated with ENSO. ENSO insurance 
fits well in a class of insurance called “contingency insurance.” 
Contingency insurance is intended to protect policyholders against 
a variety of consequences associated with a specific event; these 
consequences can include loss of assets, losses in normal business 
revenues, and increased costs associated with addressing the event. 
Experience in Peru suggests that formulating index insurance as 
contingency insurance against a natural disaster has potential 
applications in many regions of the world highly exposed to severe 
weather risks such as drought or flood.
The ENSO insurance uses the monthly sea surface temperature 
for ENSO Region 1.2 (0–10° South, 80–90° West), measured and 
reported by the NOAA Climate Prediction Center. The basis for 
payment is the average of two months—November and December. 
Three contracts are available with three different thresholds where 
payments begin (23.4, 24.0, and 24.5 degrees Celsius); each of 
these contracts reaches a maximum when the measure reaches 
27 degrees. The payout function is linear. Indemnity payments 
are made in early January, just as flooding begins, and flooding 
continues from February to April.
Indemnity payments are made by multiplying the payout rate 
times the sum insured, which is selected by the insured party. A risk 
assessment that estimates the largest losses that may occur under 
the worst flooding event is likely the best starting point for selecting 
a sum to be insured. Prudent buyers of insurance will be more 
likely to select a value that is less than these estimates, given the 
expense of this type of insurance and the fact that they have other 
risk-management mechanisms that can be blended with the ENSO 
insurance in an optimal fashion.
Since the ENSO insurance pays before the catastrophe, 
educational efforts have focused on helping people in the target 
markets understand how to use the extra cash to mitigate the 
impending crisis. Farmers’ associations in remote regions of Piura have 
expressed an interest in using the funds to clear drainage systems 
because heavy rains associated with ENSO increase the likelihood that 
drainage systems will clog. Lenders are interested in using payments 
to ease the liquidity crisis and associated cost. Those in the value 
chain are interested in smoothing their losses and maintaining their 
specialized workforce when revenues are temporarily low because 
of El Niño. Finally, ENSO insurance is also being offered to local 
and regional governments to provide ready cash to mitigate some 
problems associated with catastrophic flooding.
To begin, the insurance company is offering ENSO insurance 
only to highly exposed risk aggregators. Demand from other firms 
and institutions that are exposed to El Niño risk will then drive the 
expansion of this market. Anecdotal evidence points to substantial 
interest in ENSO insurance. After some initial press releases on the 
product, the insurer was inundated with calls from a variety of 
firms and institutions interested in the product. At this stage, ENSO 
insurance is not being made available to smallholder households. 
The product can, however, be tied to other financial services in a 
fashion that gives smallholders greater access to these services at 
better prices.
Conclusion
El Niño events affect many regions of the world. The most dramatic 
effects probably occur in Peru and Ecuador, but El Niño affects 
other countries in South, Central, and North America as well 
as in Southeast Asia and East Africa. In some regions, El Niño 
is associated with flooding, and in others it is associated with 
drought. Although no other region may have as strong a correlation 
between sea surface temperature and flooding as northern Peru and 
southern Ecuador, this project may increase awareness and lead to 
new thinking and opportunities regarding the potential for forecast 
index insurance and the relationship between natural disaster risk 
and oceanic oscillations such as ENSO.  n
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